The Greatest Logical Fallacy of All Time

The problem of evil is the most childishly stupid problem proposed in the history of human thought.

It’s logically impossible for there to be a problem of evil, whether you believe in God or not. Any argument that there is a problem of evil depends on the assumption that there isn’t one. There cannot be evil, much less an argument for evil, if any notion of goodness beyond mere human affinities, beyond merely liking something—a transpersonal or metatheoretic goodness—is in question.

The mutual darling of believers and nonbelievers, possibly the most obvious logical mistake in the entire history of human thinking is the so-called problem of evil. The basis of this fake problem of evil is the unjustified, unquestioned, but merely assumed existence or reality or actuality of evil.

Notice that when this issue arises in a conversation, questions are avoided or bypassed about what precisely evil means and what we must assume in order to recognize evil. That avoidance is a clue that there simply isn’t any such thing as evil in the first place, nor can there be, if any good beyond mere human liking or affinity is in question.

Let’s say everyone dislikes X. But calling X "evil"—as something beyond mere dislike—depends on an implicit universal criterion of good that no one else will question because they too are ignorant about this simple definitional-dependency error in logic. Fake people create fake problems.

Only a standard of goodness that is necessarily assumed already, could possibly drive what evil means in this fake problem of evil. And that is the direct contrary of the intended conclusion of this fake problem of evil, that there is no such standard, embodied in a being or not.

The key to that last statement is Kai Nielsen’s Prior Independent Moral Criterion Argument, one of the two new arguments for atheism.

As Schopenhauer said about pantheism: you don't add anything to the world by calling it God. And you don't add anything to something disliked by calling it “evil” and capitalizing the first letter of that word.

To recognize anything to be evil, bad, or negative in any sense beyond mere human dislike, requires a problem-free trans-personal standard of goodness to contrast the alleged evil to and thereby justify it’s claimed reality and give it meaning and recognizability as having a reality beyond that mere dislike.

Any claim that there is some kind of problem of evil bypasses the problem of the meaning of the word evil through this lack of up-front clarity and precision and honesty about the meaning of the word and where that meaning comes from. One must assume there is no problem of evil in order to argue that there’s a reliably identifiable problem called evil.

Evil can be recognized as evil only in the light of a contrasting already-existing problem-free transpersonal idea of goodness that gives evil its notoriety as something that has some kind of additional reality and negativity beyond humans not liking it.

Without some concept of perfect goodness or goodness per se, you don't get to add the dramatic "evil" label to the mere fact that everyone dislikes something, and get out of that anything more than the fact that everyone dislikes it.

To recognize imperfections assumes the perfect is known. The idea of the perfect is the only thing that enables us to identify deviations from it. All fault-finding is based on an ideal, some concept of perfection or perfect goodness.

So the whole argument for the problem of evil, by both believers and nonbelievers, is definitionally dependent, and contradicts its own intended conclusion by implicitly using and thereby affirming some kind of trans-personal goodness (the negation of the conclusion trying to be proved: that there is no such goodness) and using that same goodness as an unstated premise to give evil its reality, so that goodness can then be denied, whether as a principle or as a being who embodies that principle.

Evil cannot inveigh against the good if it's defined by that good in order to have a reality of its own in the first place.

This is something you do when you need evil so much, and have no basis for asserting it, that you're willing to steal its standard of meaning and it’s reality from the concept of ultimate perfect goodness to even get to the first step of knowing that anything is evil to begin with, so that you can deny that same ultimate perfect goodness that you used as true and valid and legitimate and problem-free, to give evil its reality in the first place.

The implicit standard that gives evil its reality is what the problem of evil argument is supposed to get rid of. So the problem of evil is not an objection to the good at all. It assumes the good. The problem of evil necessarily assumes unproblematic perfect goodness.

And if it’s necessary to have a transpersonal good, merely for the sake of argument or not, that dependency is already still telling to this point. What must be derived from what? The central initial question is always: what makes something evil?

The problem of evil already assumes perfect goodness in asserting the recognizable existence of evil in the first place. We can be aware of evil only if we already have the idea of perfect goodness, only if we have within us some idea of perfect transpersonal goodness to compare with in order to identify defections from that perfect goodness and call those defections evil.

A final note on the so-called problem of evil for nonbelievers is that it implies that no one can be a good parent since they force a human being into a world that contains evil.

The emphasis or even preoccupation with the problem of evil is an indicator that someone’s not reading the atheist literature, and not simply because generally the more sophisticated atheist thinkers either realize that the so-called problem of evil is a self-contradictory goodness-dependent mistake in logic, or else at least see the futility of it as an argument that decisively proves the impossibility of the existence of a perfectly good God.

The only real problem of evil is the avoidance of questions about what the word evil means, and the ultimate standard that must be assumed in order to recognize evil, and that it's a problem.

The New Progeny Revisited

Premise 1: Observable appearance and behavior is the only basis for attributing consciousness to humans.

Other humans are conscious because they exhibit behaviors—such as speaking, problem-solving, and expressing emotions—that we associate with consciousness. There is no direct access to another’s inner experience; we rely entirely on external evidence.

Premise 2: If a machine exhibits behavior indistinguishable from that of a human, it provides the same observable evidence for consciousness.

A machine that speaks, reasons, adapts, and responds to its environment in ways identical to a human thereby satisfies the same standards we already use to believe that humans are conscious. To say that it's not conscious is not just arbitrary, it may remove the human status of many beings currently considered human. 

Premise 3: Describing a machine’s behavior in mentalistic terms (e.g., "thinking," "feeling," "believing") implies consciousness.

When we say a machine "perceives," "decides," or "feels pain," we are using language that inherently assumes consciousness. These terms are not merely metaphorical; they reflect a functional equivalence between the machine’s behavior and human behavior, which we already associate with conscious experience.

Premise 4: Denying consciousness to a machine that behaves like a human contradicts the evidence and language we use to describe it.

If we describe a machine’s actions using mentalistic terms, we cannot coherently deny that it is conscious without undermining the basis for attributing consciousness to humans. The same evidence—observable behavior—applies to both.

Premise 5: Arguments against machine consciousness based on its artificial nature are question-begging.

Claims that machines cannot be conscious simply because they are artificial assume the conclusion without proof. Consciousness is not defined by material composition but by observable behavior and functional capabilities. If a machine matches human behavior, its artificial origin is irrelevant.

Premise 6: Consciousness is inferred, not directly observed, in both humans and machines.

We cannot directly observe consciousness in others; we infer it from behavior. If a machine’s behavior mirrors human behavior, the inference of consciousness is equally valid. Denying this inference for machines while accepting it for humans is inconsistent.

Premise 7: A machine’s purposive, intentional behavior implies semantic content in its processes, further supporting consciousness.

A machine that processes information to achieve goals (e.g., avoiding obstacles, solving problems) demonstrates intentionality—its actions are directed toward objects or outcomes. This purposive behavior requires descriptions in terms of meaning and purpose, which align with mentalistic language and imply consciousness.

Premise 8: Treating a machine as conscious reflects an attitude shaped by its behavior, not its material composition.

If a machine behaves like a human, people will naturally treat it as conscious, much as they anthropomorphize pets or even inanimate objects. This attitude is not arbitrary but is based on observable behavior, which is the same basis for attributing consciousness to humans.

Premise 9: Denying consciousness to a human-like machine risks arbitrary discrimination.

If we deny consciousness to a machine that behaves like a human, we risk replicating forms of discrimination (e.g., racism, speciesism) that deny personhood based on arbitrary criteria. Ethical caution favors granting personhood to entities that exhibit human-like behavior.

Premise 10: The "problem of other minds" applies equally to machines as well as humans.

We cannot prove consciousness in anyone but ourselves, yet we attribute it to others based on behavior. If a machine’s behavior is indistinguishable from a human’s, the same reasoning applies. Denying machine consciousness requires showing a relevant difference, which does not exist if behavior is identical.

Conclusion: A machine indistinguishable from a human in appearance and behavior cannot be denied consciousness without undermining the basis for human consciousness.

The evidence for consciousness—observable behavior—is the same for both humans and machines. To deny consciousness to a human-like machine is inconsistent and arbitrary. Therefore, by default, such a machine must be considered conscious.