Premise 1: Observable appearance and behavior is the only basis for attributing consciousness to humans.
Other humans are conscious because they exhibit behaviors—such as speaking, problem-solving, and expressing emotions—that we associate with consciousness. There is no direct access to another’s inner experience; we rely entirely on external evidence.
Premise 2: If a machine exhibits behavior indistinguishable from that of a human, it provides the same observable evidence for consciousness.
A machine that speaks, reasons, adapts, and responds to its environment in ways identical to a human thereby satisfies the same standards we already use to believe that humans are conscious. To say that it's not conscious is not just arbitrary, it may remove the human status of many beings currently considered human.
Premise 3: Describing a machine’s behavior in mentalistic terms (e.g., "thinking," "feeling," "believing") implies consciousness.
When we say a machine "perceives," "decides," or "feels pain," we are using language that inherently assumes consciousness. These terms are not merely metaphorical; they reflect a functional equivalence between the machine’s behavior and human behavior, which we already associate with conscious experience.
Premise 4: Denying consciousness to a machine that behaves like a human contradicts the evidence and language we use to describe it.
If we describe a machine’s actions using mentalistic terms, we cannot coherently deny that it is conscious without undermining the basis for attributing consciousness to humans. The same evidence—observable behavior—applies to both.
Premise 5: Arguments against machine consciousness based on its artificial nature are question-begging.
Claims that machines cannot be conscious simply because they are artificial assume the conclusion without proof. Consciousness is not defined by material composition but by observable behavior and functional capabilities. If a machine matches human behavior, its artificial origin is irrelevant.
Premise 6: Consciousness is inferred, not directly observed, in both humans and machines.
We cannot directly observe consciousness in others; we infer it from behavior. If a machine’s behavior mirrors human behavior, the inference of consciousness is equally valid. Denying this inference for machines while accepting it for humans is inconsistent.
Premise 7: A machine’s purposive, intentional behavior implies semantic content in its processes, further supporting consciousness.
A machine that processes information to achieve goals (e.g., avoiding obstacles, solving problems) demonstrates intentionality—its actions are directed toward objects or outcomes. This purposive behavior requires descriptions in terms of meaning and purpose, which align with mentalistic language and imply consciousness.
Premise 8: Treating a machine as conscious reflects an attitude shaped by its behavior, not its material composition.
If a machine behaves like a human, people will naturally treat it as conscious, much as they anthropomorphize pets or even inanimate objects. This attitude is not arbitrary but is based on observable behavior, which is the same basis for attributing consciousness to humans.
Premise 9: Denying consciousness to a human-like machine risks arbitrary discrimination.
If we deny consciousness to a machine that behaves like a human, we risk replicating forms of discrimination (e.g., racism, speciesism) that deny personhood based on arbitrary criteria. Ethical caution favors granting personhood to entities that exhibit human-like behavior.
Premise 10: The "problem of other minds" applies equally to machines as well as humans.
We cannot prove consciousness in anyone but ourselves, yet we attribute it to others based on behavior. If a machine’s behavior is indistinguishable from a human’s, the same reasoning applies. Denying machine consciousness requires showing a relevant difference, which does not exist if behavior is identical.
Conclusion: A machine indistinguishable from a human in appearance and behavior cannot be denied consciousness without undermining the basis for human consciousness.
The evidence for consciousness—observable behavior—is the same for both humans and machines. To deny consciousness to a human-like machine is inconsistent and arbitrary. Therefore, by default, such a machine must be considered conscious.
